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Abstract
This paper explores robust optimal targeting rules in a standard forward looking
model when i) policy maker has doubts about the parameters while private agents
know the model and ii) policy maker and the private sector share the same doubts. It
is shown that, while the robust optimal policy rule are the same in both cases, private
sector’s behavior and hence the resulting equilibrium is diﬀerent. Two diﬀerent
sources of parameter uncertainty are considered. When the agents’ doubts take the
form of uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve, robust policy rule prescribes
a less aggressive response to deviations of inﬂation from the target–contrary to the
recent ﬁndings in the literature. On the other hand, if the source of uncertainty is
imperfect knowledge of persistence of shocks, robust monetary policy calls for a more
aggressive response to inﬂation.
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Robust Control
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How to conduct monetary policy under model uncertainty has always been an inter-
est to both academicians and practitioners. One of the early studies in this area was
Brainard (1967) in which he showed that in the presence of parameter uncertainty, it
is often optimal for the central bank to act less vigorously than would be optimal if all
parameters were known. This result has found wide acceptance among both academia
and central bankers.1 Recently, there has been a growing body of literature challeng-
ing this idea, among which are Sargent (1999), Hansen and Sargent (1999a,b,2000b),
Tetlow and Von Zur Muehlen (2000), Stock (1999), Onatski and Stock (2000) and Gi-
annoni (2000a,c). In contrast to standard Bayesian approach followed by, e.g., Brainard
(1967), Chow (1975), Rudebush (1998), Clarida Galí and Gertler (1999), these authors
assumed that the policy maker has multiple priors about probability distribution of the
true model. By applying robust control methods borrowed from engineering literature,
they have found that robust monetary policy under uncertainty in general calls for a
stronger response of the interest rates to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the output gap
than in the absence of uncertainty. These ﬁndings weakened the view that parame-
ter uncertainty can account for the less aggressive nature of estimated policy reaction
functions than the ones prescribed by the theoretical models.
Using a standard New Keynesian Model, this study evaluates analytically, whether,
or under which circumstances, it is possible to reverse the recent ﬁndings in the ro-
bust monetary policy literature. In other words, we attempt to answer if parameter
uncertainty with robust decision makers can justify the so called “cautious” behavior
of central banks. It is shown that, under a plausible interpretation of the uncertainty
about aggregate supply relation, robust monetary policy rule prescribes a less aggres-
sive policy than the case of known parameters, in the sense that the former requires
moving the policy instrument less in response to deviations of inﬂation from the target.
1 It has “almost” been a stylized fact. Blinder (1998) explains the ”Brainard Priciple” as calculating
the theoretical optimal value of the desired change in the instrument (nominal interest rate in our
framework) and doing less. In his intermediate macroeconomics textbook, Blanchard (2000) explains
self-restrained behavior of policymakers as a byproduct of acknowledging model uncertainty.
1Recent literature on robust monetary policy under structural uncertainty often
assume that the policy maker faces uncertainty, while the private agents know the
model.2 We attempt to go one step further, and characterize the robust optimal
monetary policy when all agents confront model uncertainty. We argue that under
a certain interpretation of the policy maker’s belief about the private agent’s view,
robust monetary policy rules are identical to the ones under one sided case.
This study builds on the work of Giannoni (2000a,c) and partly on Hansen and
Sargent (2000b, 2001). Unlike Sargent and Hansen, but like Giannoni we consider
parametric uncertainty and derive simple policy rules. The paper diﬀers from Gian-
noni’s work in two ways. First, we characterize optimal linear robust targeting rules as
proposed by Svensson (2001a,b), rather than instrument rules. Second, we also con-
sider the situation when both the private agents and the central bank may face model
uncertainty.3
We prefer to use a simple framework to allow for an intuitive and analytically
tractable solution. Following Giannoni (2000a) and Onatski (2000) among others, we
begin with an environment in which the policymaker faces uncertainty while the private
sector does not. This assumption can be argued to be reasonable when both policy
maker and private sector has the same approximate model while the former has much
more doubts than the latter about the quality of this approximation.
Next, following Hansen and Sargent (2000b), we seek to characterize robust decision
rules when both the policy maker and the forward looking agents face uncertainty about
the model. We show that as long as the policymaker and the private agents share the
same uncertainty sets, robust monetary policy rule stays exactly the same as the case
when only the policy maker confronts uncertainty. This result is remarkable, given that
all of the recent studies on the robust policy rules which consider structured uncertainty
in forward looking models assume that private agents know the model. For our ﬁnding
2 Exceptions are Hansen and Sargent (2000b) and Kasa (2000). However, these authors consider
additive and unstructured uncertainty.
3 Another diﬀe r e n c ei st h a t ,w ec o n s i d e ra no b j e c t i v ew i t ho u t p u tg a pa n di n ﬂation stabilization,
while Giannoni (2000a,c) characterizes the solution using an objective function that incorporates
interest rate stabilization in addition to inﬂation and output stabilization.
2suggests that the robust policy rules are invariant to whether one assumes the private
agents face parameter uncertainty or not. Therefore, the results we state below are
valid for both cases.
We conduct two basic exercises to assess the implications of uncertainty regard-
ing New Keynesian Phillips curve. Under uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips
curve, we ﬁnd, in contrast to the recent literature, that robust monetary policy may
require less aggressive response to inﬂa t i o nt h a ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fu n c e r t a i n t y .I nf a c t ,
parameter uncertainty aﬀects the short run trade-oﬀ between output gap and inﬂation
by rendering inﬂation stabilization more costly. In that sense, the policy can be inter-
preted as less conservative.4 This is because the optimal rule – which is designed to
perform well in those instances in which shocks have large eﬀects on goal variables –
requires the central bank to act as if the policy instrument is less eﬀective than when
the parameters are known.
On the other hand, if the uncertainty is mostly about the persistence of ineﬃcient
supply shocks, robust optimal policy prescribes more aggressive policy in response to
inﬂation than the case of known parameters. This is also intuitive, since monetary
authority will try to avoid an especially poor performance against worst possible case
– equivalent to being exposed to highly persistent shocks in this exercise. As a con-
sequence, the central bank will move its policy instrument more vigorously in order
to “lean against a stronger wind”. Namely, it will be robustly optimal to exploit the
forward looking expectations by committing to a more aggressive rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the baseline model
and characterizes the solution in the case of known parameters. Section 3 explains
how the objective of monetary policy changes when the policy maker faces uncertainty
about the true model and summarizes the solution method. Section 4 presents two
applications of this method under parameter uncertainty of the type explained above
and assesses the implications of robust rules. Section 5 takes up the robustness problem
when all decision makers confronts uncertainty, and shows the equivalence of robust
4 Id e ﬁne conservatism as in Rogoﬀ (1985). A higher degree of conservatism means increased
concern for inﬂation stabilization relative to output stabilization.
3policy rule with the previous case. Section 6 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy with Known Parameters
We ﬁrst describe the structural model, and monetary policy problem that the central
bank faces. Next, we characterize the optimal policy with known parameters.
2.1 The Model
The baseline framework is a standard forward-looking model in the exact form used by
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999). It is similar to other models that have been used in
recent studies of monetary policy such as Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Woodford
(1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2001), Svensson and Woodford (1999) and Giannoni (2000a,
2000b, 2000c), Aoki (2000), Svensson(2001a), among others. The model consists of
two structural equations that are derived from optimizing behavior of private sector:
An aggregate supply equation derived form a ﬁrst order condition for optimal price
setting by the representative supplier and an IS curve derived form an Euler equation
for the optimal timing of purchases.
The New-Keynesian aggregate-supply equation (AS) takes the form
πt= κxt+βEtπt+1 + ut (1)
where πt is the period t inﬂation rate deﬁned as the percent change in the price level
from t − 1 to t,xt is the output gap which is deﬁned as the percentage by which
output exceeds its potential, 0 <β<1 is a discount factor, κ is a positive coeﬃcient
and ut is an exogenous disturbance term. We use the notation Etπt+1 to denote private
sector expectations regarding of πt+1conditional on information available in period t.
Equation (1) relates inﬂation to output gap in the spirit of a traditional Phillips curve.
In contrast to traditional Phillips curve, current inﬂation depends on the expected
future course of the economy, and thus on the expectations of future monetary policy,
because ﬁrms set prices based on expected marginal costs. The parameter κ can be
interpreted as a measure of the speed of the price adjustment. Output gap (xt) captures
the marginal costs associated with excess demand. This speciﬁcation allows for a shock
4ut, which shifts the distance between the potential output and the level of output that
w o u l db ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hz e r oi n ﬂation5 . These shifts are not considered to represent
variation in potential output, and thus appear as a residual in (1).We will name ut
simply as the “supply shock”6 . Within the framework, monetary policy aﬀects real
economy, because sellers cannot change their price every period as in Calvo (1983),
and Yun (1996).
The aggregate demand (IS) equation takes the form
xt = −ϕ[it − Etπt+1]+Etxt+1 + gt,( 2 )
where it is the central banks instrument which is a short term nominal interest rate,
ϕ is a positive coeﬃcient (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), and gt is an
exogenous disturbance. Deviations of output from the potential output depends upon
real interest rate, expected future output gap and a demand shock. Thus, output gap
also depends upon expected paths of real rate and the demand shock. The shock gt
can be interpreted as an exogenous variation in autonomous expenditure.
These structural equations can be derived as log-linear approximations to equilib-
rium conditions of a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which the inﬁnitely
lived representative household maximizes its lifetime utility. Disturbance terms gt and
ut follow AR(1) processes so that persistence in inﬂation and output is due to serially
correlated exogenous shocks:
ut = ρut−1 + εut (3a)
gt = ρgt−1 + εgt (3b)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤1a n dεit are i.i.d. zero mean random variables with standard deviations
σit for i = u,g. The two structural equations (1) and (2) together with a policy rule
determine the equilibrium evolution of endogenous variables πt,x t and it.
5 An example would be a variation in the markup over the wholesale prices.
6 In the literature ut is generally named as “cost push shock” (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
Giannoni (2000b), in a similar framework, justiﬁes the presence of a shock term in the AS equation,
using the microfoundations and by assuming that policymaker aims at stabilizing output around some
eﬃcient level — the level of output that would prevail under fexible prices and no market power. He
calls this shock ”ineﬃcient supply shock”.
5In this section we assume that the private sector and the central bank have the same
information and that both know the parameters of the model, the current realization
and persistence of shocks in period t and have the same information about the future
evolution of the exogenous disturbances.
2.2 Objective of the Policymaker
Traditionally, researchers have assumed that objective of monetary policy is to mini-
mize a weighted average of variability of output gap and inﬂation.7 Accordingly, we













where λ is the relative weight assigned to output stabilization. Woodford (1999b)
shows that a similar loss function can be obtained by performing a second order Taylor
approximation to the expected utility of the representative household in the model
that has been used to derive the structural equations. Woodford also shows that the
parameter λ is a function of the parameters of the structural model. However, we
will assume that λ is independent of the structural parameters and the central bank
chooses a λ that is compatible with the private agents’ preferences. The objective of
monetary policy in the case of known parameters is to choose a linear targeting rule to
implement the equilibrium variables that minimize Lt.
2.3 Policy Rule
Any prescribed guide for monetary policy conduct is a policy rule as deﬁned in Svensson
(1999). Throughout this study, we focus on a special type of policy rule which Svensson
and Woodford (1999) call “speciﬁc targeting rules” which is expressed as a direct
condition for target variables (endogenous variables that enter the loss function). These
kind of policy rules are argued to have advantages over the general targeting rule (a
high level speciﬁcation of monetary policy rule that speciﬁes the target variables, target
7 See Walsh, 1998, chap. 8; Woodford, (1999a,b), Clarida Gali and Gertler (1999), and Svensson
2001(b) for a recent discussion on this kind of objective function.
6levels and the loss function) on the grounds of higher eﬃciency in communicating with
the public. On the other hand, as argued by Svensson (2001a, 2001b), speciﬁc targeting
rules are more robust to changing structure of the economy than the instrument rules
such as Taylor rules.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the policymaker commits credibly at the beginning of
period t to a policy rule of the form
xt = −ψπt. (5)
As we mentioned above, this policy rule does not appear to be in the form of a Taylor
rule usually proposed in the literature, though as shown below, it implies a reaction
function in which monetary authority responds to deviations of inﬂation from its target
level as well as to exogenous disturbances. Nevertheless, this reaction function should
not be mixed with the targeting rule 5 itself since the implied instrument rule will
change with the speciﬁcation of the IS curve while the rule itself is robust to such
changes.
As it can be inferred from the speciﬁcation rule, we restrict attention to non-inertial
policy rules in which only the current target variables matter. This speciﬁcation can-
not deliver the globally optimum equilibrium processes since the equilibrium policy
instrument is not “history dependent”, as is explained by Woodford (1999b, 1999c).
Woodford argues that policymakers who disregard the past states and past promises
cannot achieve the fully optimal solution. However, for the purpose of this study, it is
suﬃcient to consider non-inertial rules, since our ultimate goal is to characterize un-
der which circumstances and how the Knightian uncertainty implies a less aggressive
behavior of monetary authority, rather than assessing the gains from a fully optimal
solution.
The policymaker’s problem is to choose a ψ ∈ Ψ to minimize the loss Lt,subject to
the structural equations (1) and (2). We denote the vector of endogenous variables by
qt =[ πt,x t,i t] and write q as the stochastic process {qt}
∞
t=0 .T ob ef e a s i b l eq needs to
satisfy structural equations (1), (2) and the policy rule (6) at all dates t.L e tθ ∈ Θ be
a parameter of the model where Θ ⊂ <+ is a one dimensional compact set (later in the
7text we will consider uncertainty about θ). Then a rational expectations equilibrium
can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is a stochastic process q(ψ,θ)=
[πt,x t,i t] satisfying (1),(2) and (6).
We restrict our attention to the set of policy rules that result in a unique bounded
expectations equilibrium. We use Ψ to denote such a set . The policy rule that is
optimal relative to the subset of rules Ψ c a ni nt u r nb ed e ﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 In the case of known structural parameter θ, the optimal linear monetary





where Lt is the loss function deﬁned in (5).
Now we shall characterize the optimal policy rule when there is no doubt about the
model.
2.4 Optimal Equilibrium Process with Known Parameters
In our model we can treat the output gap as the control variable. Accordingly, the
optimization problem of the central bank can be solved in two stages. The ﬁrst stage
of the solution is to ﬁnd the output gap and the inﬂation processes that satisfy the
structural equation (2) and minimize the loss function, assuming that monetary au-
thority chooses a linear policy rule of form (6). Since we restrict ourselves to the class
of ψ that yields a bounded and unique equilibrium, the solution to the ﬁrst stage of
the problem is of the form
πt = fπut,x t = fxut (7)
where the vector f =[ fπ,f x] is the vector of response coeﬃcients that parametrize the
equilibrium process of inﬂation and output gap. Feasibility restriction on the response
coeﬃcients, obtained by substituting (8) into the aggregate supply equation is
fπ = κfx+βρfπ +1 . (8)
8To solve the policymaker’s problem, we choose a plan of the form (8) and consistent
with (9) to minimize the loss criterion Lt. The response coeﬃcients parametrizing the
optimal feasible equilibrium for a given parameter θ is given by
fx = −
κ
λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2, (9)
fπ =
λ(1 − βρ)
λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2. (10)





which can also be regarded as our speciﬁc targeting rule. The central bank in turn
commits to adjust the policy instrument to satisfy this condition at every period. As
pointed out by Clarida Galí and Gertler (1999), this condition can be interpreted as
“lean against the wind” policy. Whenever inﬂation is above target, contract demand
below capacity (by raising the interest rate) and vice-versa when it is below target.
How aggressively the central bank should reduce xt depends positively on the gain in
reduced inﬂation per unit of output loss κ and inversely on the relative weight placed
on output loss κ.T h e t e r m (1 − βρ) reﬂects the forward looking behavior of the
private sector. The more persistent is the supply shock (i.e., the closer is ρ to 1) the
more aggressively the central bank contracts output, the policy instrument, in face of
inﬂationary pressures. Since a forward looking private sector will expect inﬂationary
pressures to persist, monetary authority prefers to commit to a more contractionary
policy to lower inﬂationary expectations thus the impact of shock to current inﬂation.8
The second stage of the problem is, using equation (1), to choose the interest rate
process to implement the optimal values of inﬂation and output gap given by equations
(10) and (11). This provides us with a relation between nominal interest rate, inﬂation
8 In the next sections we will consider the case where central bank is uncertain about true values
of λ and ρ, that is why it is particularly important to understand the role of these parameters for the
optimality conditions.
9the demand shock. Using (1) and (12), the implied optimal instrument rule9 can be
written as
it = γππt +
1
ϕ













where the approximation is obtained by setting β =1 . Monetary authority can imple-
ment the optimality condition (12) by setting the nominal rate instrument in line with
equation (13). Magnitude of the optimal response of the instrument to ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation (γπ) depends positively on the persistence of cost push shocks (ρ) and slope
of the Phillips curve (κ). This result will help us later to assess the implications of
uncertainty about these two parameters.
3 Robust Optimal Monetary Policy
The previous section derived the optimal policy when the parameters of the model
are constant and known to both the private sector and policymakers. Also the exact
lag structure and persistence of exogenous disturbances are supposed to be known.
In reality, central banks and researchers do not know the parameters of their models
with certainty. To be speciﬁc, we will consider two types of uncertainty within the
model. The ﬁrst is uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve, κ,w h i c hc a n
be interpreted as uncertainty about the eﬀectiveness of policy instrument, xt in our
framework. For this parameter reﬂects the induced change on the inﬂation through a
reduction of output gap by one percent. The second type of uncertainty we consider is
imperfect knowledge about the persistence of shocks, ρ.10 We will analyze the eﬀects
of uncertainty about these two parameters on optimal policy.
The underlying framework we have in mind is one of the models mentioned above,
except that the representative household can be one of several diﬀerent types. (A type
in our framework means, a speciﬁc value of κ in a given set.) We assume that the type
of the household is determined once and for all in period 0; the household knows its type
9 Instrument rules are also called “policy reaction function” in some studies.
10 In a backward looking framework this corresponds to uncertainty about the inertia of inﬂation.
10but the central bank does not. For simplicity and to obtain a clean analytical solution,
we will suppose that the weight λ that characterizes the policymaker’s preferences and
the slope of the intertemporal IS curve ϕ is known to the policymaker.
3.1 Objective of Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters
We assume that central bank commits credibly to a linear policy rule at the beginning
of period 0. Suppose the policymaker does not revise the rule at later dates using
additional information it may have collected about unknown model parameters11 .
Let θ represent an uncertain parameter in the model. We assume the θ lies in a
given (known) compact set Θ ∈ < and that the distribution of θ is unknown. We
let the policymaker have multiple priors over Θ including the possibility of that any
given element of θ ∈ Θ holds with certainty. We assume uncertainty aversion by the
central bank in the sense axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In this case
policymaker’s problem turns out to be maximization of the worst possible case, i.e.,
the situation when the prior distribution is the worst distribution in the set of possible
distributions12 . The optimal policy rule is then the robust rule deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 In the case of parameter uncertainty, a robust optimal monetary policy










Given that the unknown parameter is in Θ, the policymaker can guarantee that the
loss is no higher than the one obtained in the following minmax equilibrium.




∗  Ψ is a robust optimal monetary policy rule and θ
∗ maximizes
the loss on the constraint set Θ.
However the equilibrium that is actually realized depends upon the true value of
θ and thus is unknown to the policy maker. The objective deﬁned in deﬁnition (3) is
11 That means, as in Gianonni (2000a, 2000c), we shall restrict our attention to families of rules
that involve no learning.
12 See Hansen and Sargent (2000a) for a detailed discussion of this objective.
11consistent with the robust control approach inspired by the engineering literature, and
proposed recently by Hansen and Sargent (1999a, 1999b), Sargent (1999), Stock (1999),
and Onatski and Stock (2000). It incorporates extremely cautious behavior by the
central bank, as the policymaker cares only about the worst parameter conﬁguration.
3.2 Solution Method for the Robust Optimal Policy
In this part we explain brieﬂy the solution method formulated by Giannoni (2000a).
The method is based on the relation between the solution to problem (14) and the equi-
librium of a zero sum game. The game is deﬁned as Γ = h{P,N},(Ψ,Θ),(−L(ψ,θ),L(ψ,θ))i.
In this game, the policymaker (P) chooses the policy rule ψ
∗ ∈ Ψ to minimize his loss,
L(ψ,θ), assuming that a malevolent Nature will try to hurt him as much as possible.
The other player, Nature (N), chooses parameter(s) θ
∗ ∈ Θ, to maximize the policy
maker’s loss, as though knowing that the policymaker is going to minimize it. The
solution procedure is characterized in four steps as follows:.
1. Find the parametrization of the equilibrium process and the implied optimal
rule ψ(θ) under known parameters, taking θ as given, i.e., solve the two stage problem
that is explained above.









3. Look for a policy rule ψ
∗ that implements the minmax equilibrium.
4. Verify that ( ψ
∗,θ
∗) is a global Nash equilibrium by checking that the solution
candidate θ
∗ maximizes the loss L(ψ
∗,θ








4 Applications of Robust Monetary Policy
Note that 11 does not depend on the speciﬁcation of aggregate demand (IS) relation.
Thus the formulation of the targeting rule is fairly robust to changes in the aggregate
12demand behavior. However, the parameters of the aggregate supply equation appear
in the policy rule. Therefore a robustness investigation under parameter uncertainty
should involve the parameters in AS relation.13 Accordingly, in this section, we
characterize the robust optimal monetary policy for diﬀerent speciﬁcations about the
aggregate supply. To keep the analysis intuitive and tractable, we consider one type
of parameter uncertainty at a time. First we assume that the central bank faces
uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve, and second, we assume that the
policy maker is uncertain about the persistence of supply shocks.
4.1 Uncertainty About the Slope of the Phillips Curve
We seek to determine the optimal value of coeﬃcient ψ in the model of section 3, assum-
ing that the structural parameter κ is known to be in some given interval [κL,κ H],where
0 <κ L <κ H < ∞. For simplicity we assume all the other parameters are known with
certainty. For the beginning we assume private sector has no doubts on the model.
This class of uncertainty allows a simple analytical characterization of robust optimal
policy. Later in the text we shall consider a more complex informational structure in
which policy maker and the private sector share similar doubts.
Optimum equilibrium processes and the policy rule are already derived in section
2 for the case of known parameters. Therefore we proceed from step 2 of the solution
strategy mentioned above. We characterize the minmax equilibrium process by deter-
mining the structural parameters that obtain in the equilibrium. The next step is to
look for a policy rule that implements the equilibrium. Throughout the text we restrict
our attention to linear rules of the type xt = −ψπt. However it is important to ﬁnd the
implications of this condition for the behavior of policy instrument it. Thus whenever
possible, we shall seek to characterize the corresponding policy reaction function.14
13 Note that our speciﬁcation of targeting rules in the absence of uncertainty are not robust in the
sense of Giannoni and Woodford (2002), since the targeting condition depends on the characteristics
of the shocks, namely, ρ.
14 By policy reaction function we mean expressing the policy instrument (nominal rates in our
framework) in terms of linear functions of current or lagged observable variables such as inﬂation,
outputgap or observable shocks.
13Substituting the optimum equilibrium processes characterized by equations (8),(10)




(λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2)(1 − ρ2)
Since this function is decreasing in κ, the worst possible parameter conﬁguration
for the policy maker is the case when slope of the Phillips curve takes the least possible
value (κL) in the parameter set. Thus, the solution procedure yields the following
relations:
κ












λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2
L
ut. (17)
Given (17) and (18), it is clear that the monetary authority can implement the candi-









As a last step we need to verify if these parameters indeed constitute a global Nash
equilibrium. Using (19) and (2), loss function for any parameter conﬁguration under




2(1 − βρ)2 + λκ2
L
(λ(1 − βρ)2 + κκL)2σ
2
u. (19)
Since (20) is monotonically increasing in κ, nature still chooses κ∗ = κL in order to
maximize this loss function. Thus we conclude that the targeting rule (19) is the robust
optimal rule and (κ∗,ψ
∗) is a global Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, since ψ
∗ > 0,
our solution is unique and bounded.
Equation (19) is the robust equivalent of condition (12). At the minmax equilib-
rium, it is optimal for the central bank to engineer a smaller reduction in output in
response to an increase in inﬂation. This result is intuitive given that central bank
14is trying to minimize the welfare loss in the worst possible scenario which is the case
that κ takes the lowest possible value in the parameter set [κL,κ H].Al o wκ means a
worsened output inﬂation trade-oﬀ h e n c ear e d u c t i o no ft h eg a i ni ni n ﬂation per unit of
output loss. Thus the monetary authority is more reluctant to contract output in the
face inﬂationary pressures; in other words, it is optimal for the policy maker to respond
less t od e v i a t i o no fi n ﬂation from the target than in the case with known parameters.
Note that this policy behavior can be replicated in the absence of uncertainty by
assigning a greater weight (λ
κ0
κL instead of λ) to output stabilization than socially
optimal case. In other words, appointing less conservative central banker of the right
degree in the sense of Rogoﬀ (1985) who knows exactly the true parameters, may look
behaviorally equivalent to robust policy under uncertainty.15 Required decline in
conservatism depends critically on the relative size of the true parameter and the lower
bound of the feasible set, namely κ0
κL.
Using equation (1) and the robust optimality condition, it is possible to characterize
the corresponding instrument rule as













A comparison of this rule with condition (13) reveals that our simple interpretation
of parameter uncertainty within a robust optimal control theory framework conﬁrms
Brainard’s (1967) principle: policy instrument is less responsive to inﬂation under pa-
rameter uncertainty. This result, we believe, contrasts with the recent literature on
robust control theory which predicts a more aggressive response of the policy instru-
ment in the face of Knightian uncertainty.16
4.2 Uncertainty About Persistence Parameters
In this section, we characterize minmax equilibrium and robust policy rule when central
bank is uncertain about the persistence of the ineﬃcient supply shock, ρ. This type
15 However, the exact equilibrium will be diﬀerent if the private sector also faces uncertainty.
16 Hansen and Sargent (2000b) ﬁnd also less aggressive policy reaction in response to demand shocks
using a similar model. But their results depend on the assumtion that potential output is not observed
and agents has to ﬁlter information. Besides, they assume additive unstructured uncertainty and use
numerical methods.
15of uncertainty is of particular interest, because the New Keynesian Phillips curve in
our model is purely forward looking, and the family of targeting rules we consider
do not bring any extra inertia than that is implied by the dynamics of structural
model. Therefore, the only persistence stems from autocorrelated shocks. In that
sense, uncertainty about ρ represents not only a mere autocorrelation parameter of
aggregate shocks but also a measure for rate of convergence to the steady state.
We will assume that private sector knows the persistence of supply shocks, while
the policymaker thinks that the persistence parameter ρ lies in some given interval
[ρL,ρ H], where 0 <ρ L <ρ H < ∞.17 Variance of the shocks is known by both
parties.18 Following the solution method of the previous subsection, it is possible to
write the optimal loss under any persistence parameter ρ as
L(ψ,κ)=
λ
(λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2)
Va r(ut).
Given any variance, this function is strictly increasing in ρ. Therefore, the worst
case parameter can be characterized as
ρ
∗ = ρH. (21)
In other words, central bank will act as if the ﬁctitious evil Nature will choose the












λ(1 − βρH)2 + κ2ut, (23)
17 As explained below, if we extend the problem to two sided uncertainty in the sprit of Hansen
and Sargent (2001), the results remain intact.
18 To see the lojgic of this assumption, suppose for example, that, the parameter uncertainty set for
ρ is [0.1,0.9]. This implies a variance between 10σ2
ut and 1.1σ2
ut which is far wider than the plausible
range the central banks face in practice. As a consequence, solving for the worst case parameter will
be trivial (it will be the highest possible ρ in the set) which may be misleading. In what follows, to









What remains as the last step is to show if the candidate robust equilibrium is
indeed a globally optimum solution. This can easily veriﬁed by noting that
argmaxL(ψ
∗,ρ) = arg max
ρ∈[ρL,ρH]
λ
2(1 − βρH)2 + λκ2
λ(1 − βρH)(1 − βρ)+κ2 = ρ. (25)
Although the minmax rule takes the same form as the previous case, the behavioral
implications for the policy are just the opposite: a robust central bank will engineer
a greater reduction in output in response to an increase in inﬂation. Given that the
robust policy maker – who minimizes the loss in the worst possible case – acts as if
ρ = ρH, this result is intuitive. For higher ρ means higher inﬂationary expectations, and
since all agents are purely forward looking, the policy maker ﬁnds it optimal to respond
more to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation than with known parameters in order to exploit the
gains from commitment. By doing so, central bank faces an improved output-inﬂation
trade-oﬀ conditional on the minmax equilibrium.
Using (1), implied instrument rule that implements the minmax equilibrium is given
by













The instrument rule states that the central bank will act more aggressively to counter-
act inﬂationary pressures under uncertainty about the persistence of shocks. A compar-
ison of (26) with its counterpart in the case of known parameters reﬂects the increased
response of the central bank to inﬂationary pressures; the response coeﬃcient is unam-
biguously higher than the one in the absence of uncertainty, since ρH + κ
ϕλ >ρ+ κ
ϕλ.
To summarize the section, if we assume that the policy maker faces Knightian
uncertainty about the persistence parameter, robust optimal behavior may require
reacting more strongly to ﬂuctuations in inﬂa t i o nt h a ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fu n c e r t a i n t y .
This result is in line with the recent studies of robust monetary policy.
175 Simple Targeting Rules When all Agents are Ro-
bust Decision Makers
In the previous sections, we assumed that the private sector knows the true parameters
and thus it is only the policymaker who confronts parameter uncertainty. Since our
model has been derived from micro foundations, and the parameters of the model are
functions of the behavioral coeﬃcients, it seems natural at ﬁrst sight to treat the agents
that are being modeled as knowing their own behavioral parameters. Nevertheless,
there is at least one strong theoretical reason why the structural model represented by
(1) and (2) could be an approximation to the private agents as well.
Theoretical foundations of the aggregate supply side of the model imply a behavioral
relation between inﬂation and real marginal cost, rather than output gap variable.
Underlying the expectational Phillips curve (2) is a tight positive contemporaneous
relation between real marginal costs and the output gap that is exogenous to the
behavior of the individual price setter.19
Speciﬁcally, certain assumptions on technology, preferences, and the structure of
labor markets are embedded in the derivation of (AS) curve (2) so that the relationship
mct = ωxt holds. Indeed, Galí and Gertler (1999) argue, however, that this link is
weak and cannot be signiﬁcantly justiﬁed by the data. This argument suggests that,
from the representative agent’s perspective, uncertainty about ω can manifest itself
as uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve, κ. Therefore, if the goal is to
investigate the implications of uncertainty for the monetary policy, one can – and
must – take into account the fact that the contemporaneous eﬀect of output gap on
inﬂation is likely to be uncertain to the private agents as well as to the central bank.
That is, κ is uncertain to both parties.
19 The New Keynesian Phillips curve implied by the microfoundations takes the form of
πt= δmct+βEtπt+1+ut where mct denotes the deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state
value. It is reasonable to assume that the private agents know the parameters of this equation, since it
is their own decision that determines the parameters. For example, to assume uncertainty about the
frequency of price adjustments (or the so called Calvo (1983) parameter) does not make much sense,
given that in reality agents can control the frequency with which they set their prices. Thus if we
want to impute doubts to representative agent, we need to justify an exogenous source of uncertainty.
18Accordingly, in this section, we aim to explore the monetary policy when both the
policymaker and the private agents confront model uncertainty in making forecasts
and designing policies. We will refer to this approach as two sided robustness whereas
the case when only the policymaker confronts parameter uncertainty will be referred
as one sided robustness.
5.1 Information Structure and Objectives of Decision Makers
Revisited
In line with the previous sections, we assume that uncertainty is structured and takes
the form of parameter uncertainty. We further assume that the policy maker and
the private sector share a common approximating model, S(θ
0) and that surrounding
the approximating model is a set of models parametrized as {S(θ)| θ ∈ Θ}. In our
framework, S(θ) corresponds to equations (1) and (2). Θ is the parameter set against
which the agents plan robust behavior. For instance, if the agents are uncertain about
the slope of the Phillips curve, κ,a n dκ can lie anywhere in the set [κL,κ H], this
corresponds to θ = κ and Θ =[κL,κ H]. We impute a common objective to the private
agents and the policy maker. This assumption is reasonable given that the objective
function deﬁned in (5) can be derived as a quadratic approximation to the utility based
welfare function of the households in our model.20
Once again, the policy maker commits to a linear rule ψ of the form (6). Both the
private agents and the policymaker are uncertain about the slope of the Phillips curve,
κ. As in the one sided robustness case, the output gap, xt, can be treated as the policy
instrument of the central bank and equation (1) remains irrelevant to our analysis of
robust decisions. What is diﬀerent as opposed to the section (3) is the behavior of the
private agents, or equivalently, the way we deﬁne the central bank’s theory about the
private sector’s expectation formation.
The policy maker believes that the private agents do not know the correct model,
that they share the approximating model with the central bank, and that they form
expectations by conducting a pure forecasting method using the same slanted model
20 See Woodford (1999a) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
19that the central bank does. The policy maker’s constraints, hence, depends on its own
vision of the private sector decisions. When setting the policy, monetary authority
has to take into account not only the direct eﬀect of monetary policy rule on future
expectations (which is the typical channel in the absence of uncertainty), but also the
eﬀect induced through the robust behavior of the private agents. As explained below,
in a purely forward looking model like the one we use throughout this study, the latter
eﬀect will have strong implications.
Private sector takes the policy rule as given. Mechanically, the representative agent
substitutes the policy rule in the structural equations, solves for the target variables
that appear in the loss function, ﬁnds the worst parameter conﬁguration and bases
d e c i s i o n so nt h i sw o r s tc a s em o d e l . 21 Formally, the representative agent’s behavior
can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 Given any policy rule ψ, private agents form their decisions as if uncer-
tain parameters take the value θ
∗(ψ)=a r gm a x
θ Θ
L(ψ,θ).
Although agents have doubts about the model, uncertainty range and the objectives
are common knowledge to both sides. Thus, the policy maker is able to solve the same
problem as the private sector, and compute the worst case conﬁguration that the other
party will plan against. Therefore, the monetary authority will take into account that
the policy rule may alter his own constraint in a deterministic way. Accordingly, we
deﬁne the optimal rule of the central bank as follows.
Deﬁnition 6 Let Ψ be a set of policy rules such that there is a unique bounded equi-
librium process q(ψ,θ
∗(ψ)) for all ψ ∈ Ψ. In the case when all agents face uncertainty






The policy rules explained in deﬁnition (3) and (6) are indeed two diﬀerent state-
ment of the same object. This can be simply seen by simply noting that the ﬁctitious
21 This set up, we believe, is what Hansen and Sargent have in mind, in their manuscript (2001)
chapter 12, when they formulate robust rules for forward looking models. These authors argue that in
an environment where the government and the private sector share a common objective, it is natural
to attribute a common slanting to both sides.
20malevolent Nature is replaced by a pessimistic private sector. We state this observation
as a proposition.
Proposition 7 Deﬁnition (6) and (3) imply identical robust optimal monetary policy
rules. In other words, when both the private agents and the policymaker face uncertainty
about the parameters of the model, optimal robust monetary policy rule can still be
computed using the method described in section (3).
The solution method we used in section (3) for the one sided robustness case ensures
that, if a minmax equilibrium (ψ
∗,θ
∗) exists, ψ
∗ is the optimal robust monetary policy
rule. We have just shown that, within our speciﬁc assumptions on the central bank’s
theory about the representative agent’s behavior, two sided robust monetary policy
is exactly the same as the one sided case. Thus, the good news is, we can use the
same method to compute the optimal robust rule for the two sided robustness as well,
provided that a solution exists.
Note that we have formulated deﬁnition (3) from a diﬀerent informational assump-
tion than deﬁnition (6). The latter assumes that the private agents use the announced
policy rule ψ to solve for the worst case parameters in order to generate robust predic-
tions, i.e., the private agents use θ
∗(ψ) to slant their beliefs. Being aware of this, the
policy maker acts as if θ is a deterministic function of ψ.22 Both the equilibrium and
robust equilibrium for the two sided robustness case, then, can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8 An equilibrium when all agents are robust decision makers is a bounded




∗  Ψ is a robust monetary
policy rule, and the private sector uses the worst case parameters to slant their beliefs for
the purpose of generating robust decisions, i.e., θ




Therefore, the central bank chooses the rule knowing that it will aﬀect the con-
straint he faces. In the absence of a minmax equilibrium, a robust rule will still exist.
However, characterizing the robust optimal rule with analytical methods, in general,
is not possible, hence one has to solve for the robust rule using numerical methods.
22 One has to be careful in interpreting this deﬁnition. Imposing θ as a function of ψ in the
policymaker’s problem does not mean that the policy maker can choose the true θ. It just reﬂects
the policy maker’s theory about the behavior of the private agents. There is a true θ determined by
the nature but the agents cannot distinguish statistically between any two θ’s in the parameter set Θ
based on ﬁnite data.
21This will involve minimizing the loss E[Lt(q(ψ,θ
∗(ψ)))] over the entire set of rules Ψ
by using brute force methods.
In general, the proof of the existence of a minmax equilibrium involves numerical
methods. However, in the simple example we have used throughout this study, one can
analytically show that a minmax equilibrium exists.
Lemma 9 Given any family of rules ψ ∈ Ψ, if the solution to max
θ Θ
Et[L(q(ψ,θ))] is




Et[L(q(ψ,θ))]. Given that θ
∗is independent of ψ, it is pos-










∗))]. Using a similar











La = Lb, conﬁrming the existence of a minmax equilibrium.
5.2 Robust Targeting Rule under Two Sided Uncertainty
We will use our simple New Keynesian model to give an example of the robust monetary
policy rule in the case where all agents face parameter uncertainty, and the existence
of an equilibrium is guaranteed. The framework is the same as before except that
this time private agents do not know the true model and slant their expectations with
respect to worst case parameters. Although we have already shown that the policy
rule is exactly the same as the one sided robustness case, it is insightful, we believe,
to reanalyze the problem using the two sided robustness approach.
The policy maker commits to a rule in the form as xt = −ψπt as before. Both the
policymaker and the private agents confront uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips
curve, κ. In particular, they think that the true parameter κ lies in [κL,κ H] ∈ <+ and
the distribution of κ is unknown. Conditional on the policy rule, the central bank
b e h a v e sa si fs h ek n o w st h eκ∗ that the private agents use to slant their expectations.23
22Therefore the policy maker faces the following problem:
















where κ∗(ψ) is the parameter that private agents use to form robust predictions, i.e.,
κ∗(ψ) maximizes the expected discounted loss L(κ,ψ) over the parameter set [κL,κ H],
given the linear policy rule, ψ.
Note that, in this case, we do not need to use the solution method described above
since the optimal targeting rule can be solved directly. Accordingly, we obtain the
robust policy rule ψ
∗ in two steps. First we have to solve for κ∗(ψ). Substituting the
policy rule (6) in the AS equation, solving forward and using the resulting inﬂation








1 − ρ2. (28)




κL. Since κ∗(ψ)=κL is independent of the magnitude of the policy rule for any ψ>0,
lemma (8) guarantees the existence of a minmax equilibrium.
Next, we solve for the optimal robust rule.24 The central bank faces the constraint
πt=κLxt+βEtπt+1 + ut. (29)
Solving forward, or equivalently replacing κ with κL in (30), we can characterize the





1+κL ψ − βρ
σ2
ut
1 − ρ2, (30)
23 Notice that the policy maker has the same uncertain parameter set as the private agents. As-
suming otherwise would require a diﬀerent equilibrium concept than the one typically used in rational
expectations. See Hansen and Sargent (2000a) for more discussion.
24 As argued above, given that the private agents also face uncertainty, robust rule and the optimal
rule are equivalent in this case.






Once again, if we translate this condition into an interest rate reaction function, we
will obtain equation (20). Therefore, the policy instrument reacts less aggressively to
deviations of inﬂation from the target than in the absence of uncertainty. In contrast
to the recent robust control literature25 ,o u rﬁnding conﬁrms Brainard’s conservatism
principle.
In our characterization of one sided robustness, formally, we assumed that the
policymaker thinks that the θ the private agents use to make predictions, will solely
be determined by the nature, and thus, does not depend on the policy rule ψ itself.
On the other hand, with two sided robustness, i.e., when all agents confront parameter
uncertainty in designing policies and making forecasts, we allow the policy maker to
realize that for every rule he chooses, there is a corresponding model that the private
agents use to base their decisions. It turns out that the robust private agents in the
latter case does the nature’s job in the former case. Therefore, the one sided and two
sided robust policy rules are exactly the same.
However, the private sector’s behavior and thus realized equilibrium processes xt
and πt will be diﬀerent in general. Speciﬁcally, when the private agents know the model
and not concerned with robustness, the true processes and the realized processes under










λ(1 − βρ)2 + κLκ
ut,
where κ c a nt a k ea n yv a l u ei n[ κL,κ H].
On the other hand, when all agents are robust decision makers, one can argue that,
since the structural equations are behavioral products of actions of forward looking
decision makers, what these agents expect will completely pin down the realized para-
meters. In other words, when the robust private agents predict κ∗ = κL, Phillips curve
25 See the references in the introduction.











λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2
L
ut. (31)
The analysis throughout the study considered all three possible informational struc-
ture with two parties. Let Lo,L 1, and L2 denote respectively, the loss under known
parameter, under one sided uncertainty and under two sided uncertainty. It is straight-
forward to verify that Lo <L 1 <L 2. In other words the more is the number of parties
confronting model uncertainty, the less eﬃcient is the equilibrium.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Recent research on robust policy rules under parameter uncertainty consider only one
sided robustness. In these studies, the robust policy rules are derived with the as-
sumption that private agents know the model, while the policymaker confronts model
uncertainty. These studies provide insightful results regarding the behavior of mone-
tary authority under uncertainty. However, their validity has been overshadowed by
criticisms of the one sided nature of the analysis. This study went one step further and
took up the issue of robust monetary policy in an environment where all agents are
robust decision makers. It is shown that, under the assumptions that the policymaker
and the private agents share the same approximate model, uncertainty set, and the
objective function, robust optimal rule coincides exactly with the one derived under
the one sided uncertainty assumption. This result, we believe is interesting, in the
sense that, it allows one to use safely, the solution methods developed for the one sided
uncertainty case.
On the other hand, recent studies of optimal robust policy in forward looking mod-
els have found that under parameter uncertainty, policymaker should respond more
aggressively to deviations of inﬂation from its target value. These ﬁndings have shaken
the idea of Brainard conservatism principle which had almost been a common sense
among policy making environment. To evaluate these views, we have considered two
diﬀerent types of uncertainty that the central banks may face.
25When the policymaker does not know the true value of the slope of the Phillips
curve, we have found that robust rule prescribes less aggressive policy in response to
inﬂationary pressures. This result, we believe, is one of the rare outcomes in which the
robust control theory supports the ﬁndings of the traditional Bayesian approach under
parameter uncertainty. However our results depend critically on the assumption that
the parameters of the IS equation are common knowledge. On the other hand, our
theoretical results on uncertainty about the persistence of shocks are in line with the
recent literature on robust optimal policy. When the central bank is uncertain about
the persistence of supply shocks, Knightian uncertainty may lead to more aggressive
policy.
The model used in this study is highly stylized, thus one should refrain from drawing
normative results from our ﬁndings. Moreover (it would almost go without saying this),
even our results had unambiguously pointed out a certain conclusion, if one considers
the complexity of the type of uncertainty existing in real life, it would have been
incorrect and unwise to claim that our analysis leads to one or another kind of policy
recommendation. However, the analysis in this study, we believe, sheds some light on
the conﬂicting results available in the literature on robust optimal policies. Depending
on the type of the uncertainty in question, it is possible, in a forward looking model,
to derive both more and less aggressive rules than the case in the absence of certainty.
Therefore, parameter uncertainty itself cannot justify gradualism or activism.
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